Abstract
Introduction
Nowadays, in open and decentralized systems such as grid computing, P2P and Internet, the server (resource owner) and the client (resource requester) belong to different security domains controlled by different authorities and unknown to each other, which makes traditional access control ineffective. Trust management [1] [2] [3] [4] is an approach to make access control in open and decentralized systems with access decisions based on the evaluation of the client's credentials against the server's security policy, and establishes trust by the compliance checking algorithm to verify whether the client's request and set of submitted credentials satisfy the server's security policy.
However, such compliance checking becomes a challenging problem when the client doesn't wish to disclose its credentials before the verification is completed, or the server wishes to keep its policy private, or both. To reconcile trust establishment and privacy preservation, trust negotiation [5] [6] [7] , which establishes trust between the client and the server through bilateral credential disclosure based on disclosure policies, was proposed. But early disclosure of credentials is difficult to be prevented in existing trust negotiation protocols, and some credentials' attributes may be inferred in negotiation process.
The point-based trust management model [8, 9] allows the server to define an access threshold for each of its resources, which describes the minimum amount of points required for a client to access the resource. Meanwhile, the server defines a point value for each credential, which denotes the amount of points or credits that a requester obtains when a credential is disclosed. The client has a set of credentials, and defines a privacy score for each credentials, which represents the inverse of the willingness to disclose a credential. In real life, the client considers its privacy scores to be private, and the server considers its point values and access threshold to be also private. Yao et al [8] proposed an optimal credentials selection scheme in point-based trust management model, which formalized the credential selection problem into a knapsack problem, from which an optimal subset of credentials with disclosure-minimizing privacy could be obtained such that total private scores of disclosed credentials is minimal and the server's access threshold is satisfied. The proposed scheme is secure except disclosing the number of the credentials. However, once the server requires the client, who has two or -201 -more classes of credentials, to disclose at least one credential in each class, such as Example 1, the scheme has the limitation on obtaining the optimal set of released credentials. Example 1. The relevant credentials for online transaction are grouped into three classes: address class, financial class, and tag class. Address class includes e-mail address, home address and business address. Financial class includes credit card and bank account. Tag class includes name and nickname. A policy defined by the server requires the client to disclose at least one credential in each class except that the server's access threshold is satisfied.
In this paper, we propose a classified credential selection scheme with disclosure-minimizing privacy, which improves the scheme proposed by Yao et al [8] and allows the same class of credentials to have different point values, and also each class's threshold not to be predefined. Our scheme can obtain the optimal subset of credentials without revealing their private information when the server requires the client to disclose at least one credential of each class.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the preliminaries for our protocols. In section 3, we describe the formalization model for the classified credential selection scheme with disclosure-minimizing privacy. In section 4, we present two privacy-preserving protocols: the recursion protocol and the traceback protocol. In section 5, we analyze the security and efficiency of our protocols. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
Preliminaries

Semi-honest model
Loosely speaking, a semi-honest party is assumed to follow the protocol but tries to collect additional information other than what can be deduced from their input and output alone. A semihonest model means that all parties are semi-honest in the protocol.
The reader is referred to [10] for a more complete discussion in the semi-honest model. In this paper we construct our protocols in the semi-honest model.
Additive homomorphic encryption
Our protocols will utilize an additive homomorphic public key cryptosystem such as Paillier encryption [11] . Following [11, 12] 
Ax  is the probability that A outputs 1 on input x .
We note that our protocols use Paillier encryption for its semantical security, that is, any two encryptions are computationally indistinguishable to a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary.
Comparing split values
-202 -Like the protocol of Yao et al [8] , we also store values in a modulo-additively split manner with a large base M . A private two-party comparison protocol of split values was given in [13] , where two inputs to be compared are additively split between two parties. This protocol outputs the comparison result in a XOR-split format where neither party learns the actual comparison result. The private twoparty comparison protocol can be easily modified to compute the maximum of two values in an additively split manner, which is referred to as a private two-party maximization protocol [8] . The two protocols have been proved secure in the semi-honest model in [8, 13] . Here, we use the private twoparty comparison protocol and the private two-party maximization protocol as a black-box block in this paper.
Formalization of the Classified Credential Selection Problem
Without loss of generality, we assume that the server and the client agree on n credentials We define a binary vector 
The minimum privacy-disclosure classification credential selection problem is to select an optimal subset of the client's credentials to disclose to the server such that at least one is selected from each class, the minimum amount of sensitive information is disclosed, and the access threshold of the requested resource is satisfied by the optimal subset.
We define a new binary vector
, , , , 
We first propose a dynamic programming solution for the classified knapsack problem. In the dynamic programming process, a table is designed to track the optimal selection procedure where it is filled from top to bottom and from left to right in turn. The column in the 
} if and
Denote matrix entry () [ , ] j F i k as the traceback symbol of above two recursion equations (3) and (4). The recursion equation of () [ , ] j F i k is described as follows.
( ) 
To obtain the optimal subset of selected credentials, a traceback process is done as follows. The traceback process starts from the last entry () ( , ) Tables 2 and 3. The value at  each internal table entry of Table 2 represents the optimal value in the classified knapsack problem, and that the value at each internal table entry of Table 3 represents the value of traceback symbol in the dynamic programming process. From Tables  1,  2  and  3 , we can get 1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2 ( , , ,
y y y y y y y y  = (1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1) . That is, the optimal subset of selected credentials is
,, C C C whose amount of privacy scores is 20. 
Our protocols
Recursion protocol
Corresponding to the two recursion equations (3) and (4), the recursion protocol is described as follows.
Input:
The client C obtains privacy scores   
In above-mentioned recursion protocol, the server terminates the protocol when kT   (recall that 
Traceback protocol
Corresponding to the traceback process in Section 3, the traceback protocol is described as follows. Input: The client C has a public/private key pair ( , ) pk sk of a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme E , and publishes the public key pk . The server S has point values
, , , 
Output:
The server S and the client C learn a binary vector
, , , , M s T  which represents the privacy score associated with the unselected credentials. If it is acceptable to C according to some predefined privacy standard set by the client, the following steps will repeat until (1) (0,0) M is reached from r is  , jr  and kT   . Otherwise, the protocol terminates. The above-mentioned protocol is secure in the semi-honest model. The detailed security analysis is given in Section 5.
Security and efficiency
Security
Theorem 1. The recursion protocol is secure in the semi-honest model. Proof. We construct a polynomial-time simulator Sim which simulates the protocol's operation, and takes the semi-honest party's input and output as its input.
In order to prove the security of the client, the simulated steps are as follows. 
pk E   .
